Bleeding Ukraine’s F-16s dry of their ‘digital lifeblood’
March 10, 2025
The decision of the Trump administration to temporarily suspend intelligence support will also affect the survivability of the Ukrainian F-16 aircraft.
The degree to which modern combat air platforms rely on a constant flow of data is little known and frequently misunderstood. ‘Mission Data’ has been described as the ‘digital lifeblood’ of modern combat aircraft, and is essential to ‘tune’ and refine the performance of threat warning and defensive aids systems, countermeasures systems, and jammers, but also affecting radar and weapons performance and tactics.
Mission Data includes, but is much more than a simple ‘threat library’, since it includes not only the data needed to identify a hostile emitter, but also that required to analyse what mode that system is operating in – search, track or even engagement. It may also be used to control jamming or countermeasures, and even to provide manoeuvring cues to a pilot to help him defeat a threat.
Iterating new Mission Data loads has become something of a game of move and counter-move, as an adversary can change the frequencies on which particular systems operate, making it more difficult for friendly aircraft to accurately identify those systems, and, indeed, to jam them.
In contested environments and in dynamic situations, the requirement for new Mission Data Loads becomes more urgent, and a faster ‘Mission Data Cycle’ becomes more vital. There is now a drive to iterate new Mission Data ‘in sortie’ uploading new Mission Data Files in flight, and certainly to be able to iterate and upload Mission Data Loads between sorties.
But as well as wanting ever faster Mission Data iteration, operators increasingly want their own sovereign Mission Data capabilities, incorporating data points gleaned by real world operational intelligence gathering, rather than relying on Mission Data compiled remotely, overseas, and often quite slowly, and perhaps with some data withheld on national security grounds.
Recognising this need for sovereign national mission data, the Eurofighter Typhoon consortium has offered Electronic Warfare Operational Support (mission data reprogramming) facilities to customers, to allow operators to iterate their own mission data, rather than relying on a ‘factory load’ or on the generosity of the UK MoD, for example.
The US is not in the lead of this Mission Data revolution, and has jealously guarded Mission Data iteration, which is the responsibility of the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin Air Force base, whose various squadrons handle Mission Data for different aircraft types. Data on hostile emitters is highly classified, limiting who the US government might be willing to share it with and restricting where reprogramming work can be undertaken (usually at CONUS military facilities).
Our friends at The War Zone reported that: “As of 2022, the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing overall handled mission data or reprogramming… for over 70 systems for over 40 countries.” The 350th SWW is a focal point and centre of excellence for electronic warfare reprogramming, for the US Air Force, and for foreign allies and partners operating US aircraft types, aiming to increase lethality and survivability by developing, testing and delivering full-spectrum Electromagnetic Warfare support. The Wing’s 68th Electronic Warfare Squadron, the F-16 EW specialists, supports 31 partner nations, including Ukraine.
Even before the Ukrainian Air Force received its first batch of F-16s, it was clear that the aircraft’s EW systems would require reprogramming if they were to be effective against evolving Russian threats and would need upgrading in time to meet the delivery date of the aircraft. The US Air Force’s 68th Electronic Warfare Squadron led the reprogramming effort (which was then viewed as an urgent priority for the US and its allies and partners) in collaboration with units in Denmark and Norway.
The Advanced Systems Flight of the 68th EWS is used to working closely with foreign customers to tailor mission data to the ever-changing threat environment and to define the customer’s future requirements. But the squadron was unable to treat Ukraine in quite the same way as its other partners, despite Ukraine having been onboarded as an official foreign military sales [FMS] case.
The problem facing the 68th EWS was two-fold: one of the EW systems used on the F-16s due to be transferred to Ukraine was one that was not in the US inventory. This unspecified system was probably one of the systems supplied with ex-Danish F-16AM/BMs. These aircraft were fitted with ECIPS+ (Electronic Combat Integrated Pylon System with Missile Warning System) and/or PIDS+ (Pylon Integrated Dispenser System with Missile Warning System) pylons, incorporating missile warning systems and countermeasures dispensers. The pylons are integrated with the aircraft’s internal self-protection suite to provide synergistic effects.
The 68th EWS first had to understand the unfamiliar EW system and work out exactly how to reprogramme it. The Squadron used data provided by Denmark and Norway, then adapted its usual processes and approaches to understand the system and start its work. One deviation from normal 68th EWS processes was that it sent personnel overseas to a partner-nation laboratory to collaboratively develop and test the system alongside coalition teammates.
The then-68th EWS director noted that: “The fact that the team was able to figure out the system in two weeks, go in country with a partner to develop a best-ever mission data file is unheard of…”
“By working alongside partner nations, the 68th EWS was able to test and verify the unique elements required by the Ukrainians and even improve the reprogramming processes by all parties.”
The electronic warfare partnership between the United States and Ukraine was originally a mutually beneficial collaboration, with the US reprogramming the F-16’s EW systems, and with the Ukrainians gathering critical operational intelligence in return, passing
data collected in real combat operations back to the United States to help further refine and improve Mission Data for both countries, and for other allies and partners.
The USAF announced that the 68th EWS would provide reprogramming capabilities “based on feedback from the Ukrainians.” The Air Force release pointed out that: “Traditionally, feedback from FMS cases is derived from training environments; this case will provide combat-tested data to improve capabilities.”
But instead of this mutually beneficial relationship, the Trump administration has cut off the flow of Mission Data, threatening to leave Ukrainian F-16 pilots stuck with systems whose EW systems could become obsolete in a short time. Under the previous administration, the USAF ensured that Ukraine could keep pace with Russian adaptation of its systems by constantly adjusting and upgrading its AN/ALQ-131 and other EW systems via new Mission Data files.
The withdrawal of EW support has further exacerbated concerns about the future support and sustainment of US-supplied aircraft in service with many European armed forces.
