The F-35 (probably) doesn’t have a physical ‘kill switch’ – but it doesn’t need one!
March 12, 2025
The potential vulnerability of F-35s operated by export customers to US ‘interference’ or limitation is a complex and nuanced subject, and many of the ‘takes’ that we have seen in the press over recent days have been mistaken, on both sides of the debate. Joachim Schranzhofer, the head of communications at Hensoldt, the German defence electronics company, told Germany’s Bild newspaper that: “the kill switch in the F-35 is more than just a rumour.” He is almost certainly wrong.
On the other hand, the press release issued by the Swiss Department of Federal Defence on 7 March, stating that: “Switzerland does not need consent if it wants to use its weapons systems or guided missiles for its own defence. It can do this autonomously, independently, and at any time,” is also incorrect, at least insofar as the F-35A will be concerned.
Although it cannot be achieved at the flick of a switch, the US can effectively control and even prevent the use of a customer air force’s F-35s – perhaps not instantaneously, but certainly in very short order. Tyler Rogoway of the War Zone website recently wrote on X that: “You don’t need a ‘kill switch’ to severely hamper the utility of an exported weapons system, you just stop providing support for it and it will wither away, some systems very quickly. The more advanced the faster the degradation.”
This was not always the case. In the past, Iran and Venezuela both discovered that their US-supplied F-14A Tomcats and F-16A Fighting Falcons could be kept operational even after the withdrawal of US support, and after the imposition of sanctions, albeit at high cost.
Today’s combat aircraft are a completely different ‘kettle of fish’, and are much more dependent on manufacturers and suppliers for sustainment and support. Few aircraft are more reliant on such support than the F-35, thanks to the complexity of its systems, the sensitivity of its capabilities and its dependence on data, and to a long-standing US reluctance to allow customers to use their own sovereign capabilities and resources.
The official line is that the F-35 programme ensures that all F-35 operators have the “necessary capabilities to sustain and operate their own aircraft as part of a global partnership with the full functionality and support that they might require.”
This is not, however, an entirely accurate picture.
The F-35 programme is tied to US security regulations which prevent foreign customers from undertaking particular work packages on the aircraft and its systems, and which dictate that some functions have to be undertaken in US Government or contractor-operated facilities in the continental United States (CONUS). Other elements of the programme are vendor-locked, ensuring that Lockheed Martin, and Pratt & Whitney have an effective monopoly in some programme areas, preventing customers from (for example) integrating their own weapons, and excluding them from huge areas of maintenance and support.
Many individual F-35 components, including some avionics ‘black boxes’, are sealed for security, proprietary or export control reasons and have to be sent back to designated facilities for repair or maintenance. No effort has been made to developing the skills or knowledge base to undertake such work locally in customer nations, and the repair and maintenance of these components could easily be ‘turned off’.
While not as dramatic or as immediate as a ‘kill switch’, the US could use a removal of access to these services to bring a customer’s F-35 fleet to its knees – and in a relatively short period of time. There is little scope for an F-35 operator disconnected from the wider F-35 programme’s supply chain to keep aircraft flying by cannibalising spares.
But the US has even blunter instruments at its disposal.
ALIS and ODIN
Early F-35’s relied on the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) to manage logistics and maintenance, while later aircraft use the improved Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN). Both are cloud-based networks which transmit aircraft health and ‘maintenance action information’ to technicians worldwide and are used to manage maintenance, prognostics, the supply chain, customer support services, training, and technical data.
ALIS uses radio frequency downlinks to pre-position parts and engineering resources to where they are needed, leveraging the tightly controlled global parts and support ecosystem, operating under a ‘just-in-time’ logistics concept. Withdraw or block access to ALIS/ODIN, and any F-35 fleet would rapidly grind to a halt.
There have been concerns that ALIS/ODIN could be used as a vector for cyber attacks to feed malicious information into the network, and to disrupt or disable F-35 operations. There is an argument that if aircraft software can be remotely patched, then it could just as easily be disabled, perhaps preventing the operation of key systems. At one time it would have been inconceivable that the US could mount a cyber attack against an ally and F-35 customer, but with President Trump at the helm, threatening Denmark with an annexation of Greenland, and undermining Canada’s status as a sovereign nation, old certainties may no longer apply!
Moreover the ALIS/ODIN systems also serves as the port through which data packages are loaded onto Joint Strike Fighters before they can fly a sortie. These data packages can include mission planning information but also highly sensitive Mission Data Files (MDFs).
Mission Data
Mission Data can be thought of as the digital ‘lifeblood’ upon which modern combat air platforms rely. AGN has covered the subject in some detail.
More than just a threat library, Mission Data provides known target characteristics for the fusion engine that allows the F-35 to identify targets with minimal emissions, allowing the aircraft’s sensors to make sense of all the information that they are ‘seeing’. Without Mission Data the F-35’s sensors don’t have anything to compare against the data gathered, making it effectively meaningless. Mission Data enables the sensors to work.”
The F-35 is more dependent on Mission Data than most aircraft. People often assume that Low Observability (stealth) is the key to the F-35’s survivability, but being ‘less visible’ to enemy radar is only one part of the survivability ‘jigsaw’. Like the F-117A Nighthawk before it, the F-35 is heavily dependent on its mission planning system, which uses Mission Data to determine the ‘blue line’ (the aircraft’s minimum-detectability flightpath to its target or operating area). Mission Data is used to plot the effective coverage of enemy Missile Engagement Zones, taking into account the F-35’s stealth and electronic warfare capabilities, onboard sensor and weapons employment envelopes, and even to calculate the best angles of bank during a turn to minimise exposure to enemy radar.
When an F-35 returns to base after a sortie, ALIS/ODIN is the means by which intelligence and other data collected during that mission is downloaded for further analysis and exploitation – including the iteration of new Mission Data Files.
Restricting the use of ALIS/ODIN could thus significantly reduce the F-35’s operational effectiveness, undermining its survivability and increasing its vulnerability to enemy threat systems.
But even if ALIS/ODIN is fully operational, the US Government has other ways of blocking or restricting the flow of Mission Data to customer air forces.
International F-35 operators “are not allowed to conduct independent test operations outside of the Continental United States (CONUS) based on US policy. United States Government (USG) security rules and National Defense Policy (NDP) require that US citizens perform specific functions in order to protect critical US technology.”
This means that all F-35 Mission Data is compiled and produced within the 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin AFB in Florida.
Mission Data for all US F-35s, including those flown by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps is produced by a dedicated unit, the 513th EWS, which does not provide Mission Data to F-35 partners and export customers.
Instead, F-35 Mission Data for Partner Nations is programmed, tested and fielded by an F-35 Partner Support Complex (PSC), which was established in 2016 within the 350th SWW. The PSC includes US personnel to conduct those functions that are deemed ‘NOFORN’, but the activity is 100% funded by the supported nations, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Japan, Korea, Israel, Poland and Belgium. These nations are not allowed to conduct independent test operations outside of the CONUS (continental United States).
Three main flights are embedded within the PSC. The Australia/Canada/United Kingdom Reprogramming Lab (ACURL) has 40 British, 20 Australian and two Canadian military personnel working alongside 30 US personnel (Canada joined in October 2024); The Norway/Italy Reprogramming Lab (NIRL) has eight Italian and seven Norwegian military personnel working with 35 US personnel; and the MDx Reprogramming Lab (XRL) has 40 US personnel supporting all other F-35 nations and customers.
It can be seen that the US maintains a tight grip on the F-35’s Mission Data, and that access could easily be limited or even removed.
Other operational dependencies
The F-35 is heavily reliant on space-based and other ‘beyond-line-of-sight’ communications systems, datalinks and networks, for targeting and ISR, most of which is currently provided by the USA. More widely, most allied air forces (including those operating the F-35) are deeply dependent on US ‘enablers’, including air to air refuelling tankers, ISR, AEW and airborne battle management platforms. These air forces (and especially those operating the F-35) are also reliant on US-provided weapons and munitions. The withdrawal of any of these would result in serious operational impacts.
Even before the Trump administration took office, many were deeply concerned about Europe’s growing dependence (or even over dependence) on US weapons systems, which, it is averred, effectively erode sovereign national capabilities. Concerns about the US stranglehold on F-35 Mission Data, the apparent US reluctance to integrate non-US weapons, and the effect of buying US weapons on national defence industries date back years.
With the current trajectory of US government policy towards Ukraine and NATO leading to a real divergence between America and its European allies, there are perceptions that the White House has already set a precedent of refusing to provide support for weapons systems it sells. This has led to real fears that a wider withdrawal of US support and sustainment could cripple the F-35’s combat effectiveness, and that the US could effectively exercise a veto over F-35 operations by its allies. The pervasive myth that the US has embedded a ‘kill switch’ in the F-35 should perhaps be seen against this background, and while there is no switch that could ‘brick’ the aircraft, there is no doubt that the F-35’s combat effectiveness could be dramatically reduced, and that operations could eventually be made unviable by Washington.
