Tail strikes explained: Why they happen and how airlines work to avoid them
October 19, 2025
A tail-strike involving an Airbus A300-600 operated by European Air Transport (EAT) at London Heathrow has renewed scrutiny of one of aviation’s most persistent operational hazards – maintaining pitch control during landing, baulked landings and go-around manoeuvres.
The incident occurred during an attempted landing by the cargo aircraft on 12 October, which was operating on behalf of DHL Express.
Video shows the aircraft’s tail in contact with the runway before the crew initiated a go-around and landed safely on a parallel runway.
Another incident, also occurring earlier this month, involved an EVA Air Boeing 787-9 aircraft, which suffered a tail strike while performing a go-around at Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport in Taipei.
And Wizz Air has seen its first Airbus A321XLR grounded for over a month after a hard landing and tail strike in Prague in September, just weeks after taking delivery of the new jet.
What is a tail strike?
According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a tail strike is defined as “contact between an aircraft’s empennage and the runway surface during take-off or landing”.
A tail strike occurs when the rear underside of an aircraft – usually the fuselage just forward of the tail – makes contact with the runway surface during take-off or landing.
While many tail strikes cause only minor scraping, others can result in serious structural damage, particularly to the rear pressure bulkhead, and require extensive inspection and repair before the aircraft can return to service.
Such occurrences, while rarely resulting in injuries, can also cause significant operational disruption if aircraft are declared AOG and require maintenance action.
What causes a tail strike?
Boeing’s Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents notes that tail strikes typically occur when an aircraft’s pitch attitude exceeds design limits.
It typically happens when the aircraft’s nose is pitched up too steeply or too quickly, often due to over-rotation on take-off or excessive flare on landing.
Go-arounds from low altitude, particularly when combined with high thrust and abrupt pitch input, are also identified as contributing factors.
Other factors can increase the likelihood of a tail strike, including the aircraft type (for example, the longer Airbus A321 has a higher incidence versus the Airbus A319) and the flap configuration for landing (flap 3 has a higher risk due to the higher nose attitude on landing, versus a full flap landing).
Airbus has addressed this risk in its Safety First magazine, emphasising the need for stable approach management and controlled pitch handling during flare and go-around phases.
An excessive nose-up pitch rate, particularly at low energy or low altitude, can result in contact between the aircraft’s tail and the runway surface, Airbus warns.
The manufacturer advises crews to adhere strictly to stabilised approach criteria and to avoid late and excessive corrections.
Assessing the risk and implications of a tail strike
While the structural consequences of a tail strike can vary, the financial and operational implications are often significant.
Boeing says that even minor incidents can cost airlines in repairs, inspections, and lost utilisation of the airframe. Damage to the aft fuselage or rear pressure bulkhead can necessitate extensive repairs before the aircraft can return to service.
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has also highlighted tail strikes as a continuing safety concern in its Annual Safety Review, calling for enhanced data analysis through Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programmes.
Its 2025 edition says that 12 out of 18 non-fatal accidents in 2024 had resulted in substantial damage to an aircraft. Of these cases, four were tail strike accidents.
Preventing a tail strike: Training and experience
By tracking repeated unstable approaches or high-pitch attitudes, operators can better target pilot training and identify other contributory factors.
Modern evidence-based training (EBT) and competency-based training and assessment (CBTA) programmes – frameworks promoted by IATA and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) – are increasingly used to address such risks.
These systems focus on developing pilots’ decision-making, manual handling, and situational awareness, helping crews anticipate and manage pitch and energy more effectively during critical flight phases.
For all the advances in flight control systems and automated protection, both Airbus and EASA stress that prevention ultimately rests with pilot technique and adherence to standard operating procedures.
To mitigate the risk, Airbus has improved the flare law of the flight control law of the A320 and A321 by introducing a limitation of the side stick nose up inputs during landing. This limitation is triggered by the ground spoiler extension, ensuring that it will be active only during landing.
Another Airbus modification has introduced a pitch limit indicator on the Primary Flight Display, which is displayed at landing (below 400 feet AGL in both manual and automatic modes) when the thrust levers are below the FLEX/MCT setting.
The OEM has also integrated a “PITCH, PITCH” call out, activated when the pitch – and pitch rate – is above a certain threshold.
The EAT incident at Heathrow and the EVA incident in Taipei serve as a reminder of the risks of a tail strike. For both regulators and operators, the two cases highlight that even the most sophisticated aircraft still depend on precise human handling for a safe and uneventful landing.
Featured image: Big Jet TV/Youtube
